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Most studies of President Theodore Roosevelt address his “southern strategy” to 
revive the Republican Party’s fortunes in a region where it was effectively shut out 
by 1900. This essay revisits Roosevelt’s approach to the South between 1901 and 
1912 and argues that wooing white southerners away from the Democratic Party, 
more than any other approach, represented Roosevelt’s overriding strategy for the 
revitalization of the southern GOP.  
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In the final decades of the long nineteenth century, the southern Republican Party was 
effectively moribund. Nevertheless, Theodore Roosevelt, a “half-southern” Republican, aimed to 
revive his party’s fortunes south of the Mason-Dixon Line following his chance rise to the 
presidency in the fall of 1901. The Democratic Party had, to this point, successfully managed to 
portray the Republicans as a party bent on self-servingly advocating “negro domination” of the 
region, and many southern Democrats had tied their political fortunes firmly to the cause of the 
white man. As a result, what was left of the Republican Party’s southern electorate did indeed 
consist largely of the black voters of the region. Yet, Roosevelt’s ascendency came in the midst 
of a period historian Michael Perman has labelled “Restoration,” when black participation in the 
region’s elections all but came to an end.1 In the 1890s, southern black voters had, with few 
exceptions, cast their ballots for Republicans, Populists, and fusion candidates—anyone but the 
Democrats who controlled most state legislatures in the South by that point.2 By 1901, however, 
most of the region had enacted state-level legislation that sought to remove black voters from 
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the electoral roll.3 As a result, the number of registered African-American voters in Louisiana—
to take just one example of the regional trend—had fallen from some 130,000 in 1896 to a mere 
5,000 by 1900.4 By the time Roosevelt took office, the black vote had shifted from being a 
sizable minority of the southern voter base to a statistical irrelevance. Consequently, the region 
was more than ever the domain of the Democratic Party, which, in the South at least, wore its 
white supremacist credentials for all to see. For electoral success in the region, Roosevelt 
seemingly had two options. Either, he might revisit the unpopular Reconstruction-era strategy of 
federal intervention to forcefully enfranchise black voters, an idea that had last arisen with the 
failed Republican Force Bill of 1890, or, he could try to win over white voters instead.5 
Roosevelt, it is argued here, pursued the latter course as part of a southern courtship strategy 
between 1901 and 1912, in a concerted attempt to rebuild a viable—white—Republican 
electorate in the South.  
Roosevelt’s presidency has hardly been bereft of historiographical or popular attention 
over the last century, and his approach to the South has been no exception to this.6 When 
attention is paid to a “southern strategy,” it tends to take two or three different guises, rather 
than appearing as one coherent “strategy” at all. First, some argue that Roosevelt’s strategy was 
to overhaul his corrupt and neglected party in the South, while including the GOP’s traditional 
African-American base in the process. Second, many argue that Roosevelt’s strategy was 
cynically aimed at acquiring loyalty from the existing Republican factions in the South purely to 
secure delegates for his re-nomination in 1904. Third, there are those that see Roosevelt as trying 
to rebuild his party in the South by courting white voters and, in so doing, break the grip the 
Democrats held over the region.7 The issue with much of the existing literature is that it tends to 
focus too much upon the first two “strategies” (usually sequentially), and presents the third—if 
at all—as a default adopted after the first two strategies had either failed or run their course. 
What this consensus often underplays is Roosevelt’s longer-term adherence to the third strategy: 
courting the white South.  
NB: This is the accepted version of the article, but not the finalized and copy-edited version. Changes might have been made to style and 
referencing in the published version. 
 3 
In the best early essay on the subject, Roosevelt’s biographer Henry Pringle focuses on 
the first two strategies: for him, Roosevelt began with reform but caved to pragmatic self-interest 
as the 1904 election approached.8 Pringle’s view was largely reiterated by the godfather of 
southern history, C. Vann Woodward, and later works did little to challenge this narrative—
though they added valuable depth to illustrate Roosevelt’s complex relationship with African 
Americans.9 Despite scores of excellent works on Roosevelt, the Republican Party, and the 
South, few subsequent studies have sought to challenge this consensus presentation of 
Roosevelt’s change of course, from a reformist pro-black approach to a cynical abandonment of 
African Americans by 1903–1904.10 However, Gary Gerstle’s excellent American Crucible argues 
that Roosevelt was not so Machiavellian as to change course in 1904, from courting blacks to 
wooing white voters instead.11 This essay both agrees and disagrees with Gerstle. It agrees in 
respect to the fact that Roosevelt did not really change course. However, it disagrees regarding 
Roosevelt’s Machiavellian tendencies, as it is argued here that he had been slowly abandoning 
African Americans and increasingly wooing white southerners since the very beginning.   
Clearly Roosevelt’s views on race need some consideration, though they are not the 
primary focus here, as Roosevelt’s courtship of white southerners was essentially pragmatic, 
given the almost impossible chance of winning elections in the South with what remained of the 
black electorate. The most influential works on Roosevelt’s racial views are probably still those 
of Thomas Dyer and Gary Gerstle who both, while noting that Roosevelt’s views were far more 
complex and nuanced than many of the race-baiting southern Democratic politicians of the era, 
accept that Roosevelt regarded African Americans as members of an inferior race.12  However, 
even if Roosevelt had more enlightened views than some, he did believe that African Americans 
were, in the main, ill-fitted to exercise the political rights secured by the Fifteenth Amendment.13 
If Roosevelt really believed the franchise had been a step too far, then it is not so hard to believe 
he could turn a blind eye to it being taken away. Roosevelt’s key advisor on all things African-
American was himself a black man, the influential educator, Booker T. Washington, whose 
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famous Atlanta Compromise speech in 1895 had advocated self-help for African Americans, and 
seemed to accept social inequality for the time being.14 Though more recent explorations of 
Washington have stressed his work for greater African-American rights in the period, he was 
widely presented at the time as an “accommodationist” who accepted the prevailing situation in 
the South for the sake of his own advancement.15 This presentation of Washington, albeit one-
dimensional, worked well for Roosevelt: Washington could be held up as a symbol of inclusion, 
and a figure who did not stress the primacy of political participation. Roosevelt’s approach to 
African Americans was almost entirely symbolic. He felt that token appointees and rhetoric 
would distract from his broader abandonment of southern blacks, and yet serve to show that he 
was not excluding all black people. Though he couched his gradual abandonment of African 
Americans in terms of meritocracy—in his opinion, very few black people deserved elevation to 
political office—the ultimate purpose was to appoint more white southerners as part of a lengthy 
campaign to win over white voters in the region. Thus, if his grand strategy failed, he could 
always fall back on his traditional base, which he had technically never discarded.   
Democratic domination of the South had not gone unchallenged since the end of 
Reconstruction, but the rise and fall of the southern Populist movement in the 1890s had 
illustrated how difficult it was to battle against entrenched regionalism and southern political 
traditions.16 The Populists, like the Republicans, struggled to overcome the racial divisions of the 
South, and many of the more established black politicians in the region continued to support the 
Republicans in order to maintain what little power they had left.17 Meanwhile, factions of 
pragmatic southern Republicans, favoring a white-only party—the so-called “lily whites”—had 
begun appearing since the 1880s and grew increasingly dominant in some southern state 
Republican machines at the expense of the so-called (racially inclusive) “black-and-tans.”18 
Roosevelt, however, wanted to build something far larger than the often paltry lily-white factions 
that his party had managed to amass to that point. The true objects of Roosevelt’s desire were 
the vast majority of white southern voters who were currently firmly in the hands of his 
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Democratic rivals. What followed was a more than decade-long courtship of these voters that 
was necessarily restrained, at least in public, for fear that he might ultimately be rejected. 
 
First term 
As noted above, most historians, when considering any sort of “southern strategy,” consider two 
approaches in Roosevelt’s first term, ahead of the underlying—and primary—strategy of 
courting white southerners. First, the initial enthusiasm for reform in conjunction with the 
traditional African-American voter base, and second, a turn to pragmatic abandonment of 
principle with a view to gathering delegates for his re-nomination at the 1904 convention. This 
article seeks not to dismiss these approaches entirely, but to reassert the primacy of the courtship 
of southern white voters. It is important, however, to see how these approaches bear up to 
scrutiny under a different light, and it is fitting to start with the idea that Roosevelt initially 
started with a principled stance to reform the party and uphold the rights of African Americans.  
The main instance historians inevitably turn to when considering this first approach 
came very early on in Roosevelt’s presidency, when he invited Booker T. Washington for dinner 
at the White House on 16 October 1901. Inviting the most prominent black man in the nation to 
the White House seemed significant, particularly to those looking for hopeful signs of a true 
successor to Lincoln’s legacy. The meeting was recast by the press, in a variety of forms, for 
months to come, becoming what Roosevelt termed “an international affair.”19 Some African 
Americans saw the dinner as the start of a new commitment to African-American equality, while 
many white southerners saw the dinner as an early affront and a sign of an integrationist agenda. 
Roosevelt defended the dinner simply as “showing some little respect” to an exceptional black 
man of the age and claimed that the southern reaction was “literally inexplicable.”20 However, 
the furor over the dinner overshadowed its true nature: the purpose of the meeting was to 
discuss Roosevelt’s plans for the South. Roosevelt and Washington felt that it might be best to 
appoint fewer blacks to federal positions in the South, so long as this was balanced with some 
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“compensatory” African-American appointments in the North. They also agreed to consider 
conservative white Gold Democrats to fill vacant southern offices.21 Indeed, one of 
Washington’s first suggestions to Roosevelt was Thomas Goode Jones, a former Democratic 
governor of Alabama.22 Here, from the very outset of his presidency, the roots of Roosevelt’s 
courtship of the white South can be seen not far below the surface, yet the purpose and 
outcomes of the meeting were, and have continued to be, obscured by the fiery debates and re-
imaginings of the dinner itself.  
The Washington dinner was certainly the most high-profile event that both African 
Americans and southern Democrats seized upon to depict Roosevelt, incorrectly, as an advocate 
of racial equality, but further such instances appeared across the southern press throughout 
Roosevelt’s first term. Among the most notable were his few appointments of African 
Americans to federal offices, such as Minnie Cox as postmistress in Indianola, Mississippi and 
William Crum as Collector of the Port of Charleston in South Carolina. Roosevelt defended both 
appointments as being motivated by merit, not racial considerations.23 The fact that Roosevelt 
doggedly stuck to his guns, in spite of the backlash these appointments received, should come as 
little surprise to any who have studied the colonel. Roosevelt also gave a number of speeches 
denouncing lynching and peonage that were deemed pro-black and anti-southern despite 
Roosevelt’s frequent attempts to avoid overtly sectional language.24 All of these examples were, 
however, far more symbolic than they were substantial—something African-American civil 
rights leaders, like Bishop Alexander Walters, came to realize by 1904.25  Though couched in the 
rhetoric of appointing the best people for the job, regardless of race, Roosevelt’s black 
appointments were the exceptions that proved the rule. Roosevelt actively sought to appoint 
fewer blacks to office in the South throughout his terms, as he noted on numerous occasions 
that are explored below, and this was the sum total, in terms of “substance,” of his approach to 
African Americans during his time in office.  
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One of the few arenas in which southern Republicans still had any significant political role 
to play was in nominating their party’s presidential candidate at the party convention where, 
despite their practical electoral inconsequentiality, southern states were still generously 
represented in terms of convention delegates. This is the arena to which historians since the 
1930s have looked in order to show Roosevelt’s change of direction, away from African 
Americans and towards a more pragmatic stance. As noted above, one might take issue with the 
idea that Roosevelt had ever truly embraced African-American rights as an issue in the first 
place. Furthermore, it is argued here, though Roosevelt did indeed take a pragmatic approach to 
secure delegates, he at no point abandoned his primary aim of wooing white southerners in the 
longer term.  
Mark Hanna, President William McKinley’s chief campaign strategist in 1896, had played 
out his own version of the delegate-grabbing kind of “southern strategy” to ensure McKinley’s 
nomination at that year’s convention. Hanna went so far as to purchase a holiday home in 
Georgia and engineer an “impromptu” visit of the McKinleys to the region in order to impress 
delegates, who in turn hoped for federal patronage if McKinley went on to win with their votes.26 
Roosevelt wrote extensively about his disdain for this sort of politics and claimed he would 
eschew a patronage-based approach.27 But, inevitably, to change the face of the party in the 
South in the long term would mean remaining in the White House in the short term and seeing 
off a potential challenge from Hanna in 1904, who had a ready-made base from his earlier 
campaigns for McKinley.28 Thus, Roosevelt did indeed take on a pragmatic approach to securing 
delegates in order to support his re-nomination in the region, picking up the scraps left over by 
Hanna by distributing patronage according to the local dynamics of the various state Republican 
parties.29 Roosevelt supported lily-white Republicans in some states while supporting black-and-
tans in others.30 This was neither an abandonment of a pro-African American approach—which 
had never really existed—nor an abandonment of his courtship of white Democrats, whom he 
continued to pursue. For Roosevelt, who disingenuously claimed not to understand claims he 
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was delegate-grabbing, his critics were missing the point. Though he may have been gathering 
delegates with strategic distribution of federal appointments, his long-term strategy of wooing 
Democratic white southerners was unaffected, and this was more likely to upset both factions of 
his own party. If he was primarily concerned with delegates above all else, he reasoned, why 
would he keep appeasing Democrats who could not return him as his party’s nominee? He wrote 
to Henry Payne, one of his chief delegate-securers in the South, to decry press criticism along 
these very lines: 
The correspondent of the [New York] Times is a particularly malicious and 
slanderous liar, and he is now seeking to discredit me by the utterly absurd 
statement that through you and [Thomas] Clarkson I have been maneuvering to 
get southern delegates. The comic feature of the situation is that you and I had 
agreed that the course I was following would probably render it certain that if 
there was any formidable opposition to me I should lose the delegates from the 
Gulf States, at least.31 
 
Though lacking sincerity in his incredulity about his attempts to secure delegates in the 
region, Roosevelt hits upon an important point when he suggests that his policy up to 
that point had hardly been well-coordinated to this end. Appointing Democrats to 
federal patronage positions, ahead of both main factions of his own party, was 
counterproductive in a delegate-grabbing strategy. In terms of the long-game of wooing 
a new white voter base, however, it made perfect sense. Though Roosevelt did wish to 
secure delegates, and played Hanna at his own game in trying to do so, it was not his 
overriding aim for the South.  
Forging relations with Democrats in the South was not unique to Roosevelt’s 
administration, but it was approached to a different end. Hanna and McKinley had, after all, 
given Democrats like Senator John McLaurin of South Carolina considerable control over 
federal patronage in the region as part of Hanna’s lily-white, delegate-securing strategy in the 
region.32 When Roosevelt set about his own course in the South, despite the senator’s links to his 
rival Hanna, Roosevelt continued to consult McLaurin, who himself was a victim of the fractious 
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political scenes that varied enormously from southern state to southern state.33 McLaurin’s 
closeness to the Republicans, and spectacular falling out with his former ally and fellow 
Democratic Senator, Ben Tillman, saw him effectively de-selected in 1902 and caricatured in the 
press as a “Roosevelt” man.34 Roosevelt soon set about finding McLaurin a federal judicial 
appointment instead, though McLaurin balked at this, sensing it would look like a reward for 
loyal service.35 Despite consulting and appointing many such southern Democrats, Roosevelt felt 
that his efforts to placate white southerners went under-appreciated and that—to a large 
degree—most southerners seemed to be overlooking his subtle overtures.  
In early 1903, Roosevelt wrote to North Carolinian newspaper editor Silas McBee to 
point out that the “immense majority” of his southern appointments had been “white and in 
some States, in fact, I think in most of the States in question, the majority have been 
Democrats.”36 Later that same month Roosevelt listed his various Democratic appointees in a 
letter to the editor of the Atlanta Constitution.37 If Roosevelt was solely interested in attracting 
delegates from within his own diminished party, he certainly spent a lot of time working with 
Democrats and worrying about what the southern press made of him.38 By the end of 1903, as 
Roosevelt’s own re-nomination and re-election battles loomed into view, he wrote to Republican 
veteran Carl Schurz explaining once again his policy of not saying “one bitter word” about the 
South in public, even to the extent that he had chosen to ignore the rampant abuses against 
African Americans’ constitutional rights in the region. Instead, Roosevelt suggested, he had: 
…confined myself to supporting such men as Judge [Thomas Goode] Jones 
(my appointee by the way) in the peonage cases etc. I have had to frown on 
lawlessness, as in the Indianola case [Minnie Cox].... in the Southern States as 
a whole the great majority of these appointments that I have made have been 
of democrats, and not more than one or two per cent have been colored 
men.39 
 
He then decried the bad press he received in South Carolina and Mississippi, despite 
appointing ex-Confederate Democrats ahead of the “utterly rotten” Republicans in those 
states.40 However, the final remark Roosevelt made was particularly telling: he argued that 
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his actions in these states had surely turned his party there against him, to the extent that 
“anyone would see that my course was not dictated by my political self-interest.”41 Though 
never one to overlook his own political self-interest, here Roosevelt stressed the potential 
precariousness of balancing a short-term delegate-grabbing effort alongside his long-term 
courtship strategy. Unfortunately for historians seeking to find out how this potential clash 
of strategies might have turned out, Roosevelt’s great potential rival for the nomination, 
Mark Hanna, died in February 1904, some months before the nominating convention. 
Though it is going too far to suggest Roosevelt was not interested in delegates, as he most 
certainly was keen to secure his re-nomination, it is important to recognize that all along he 
continued to pursue his careful dalliance with white southern Democrats, however 
imprudent this might have been. 
 
Second term 
With re-nomination secured, the presidential election of 1904 ultimately followed predictable 
lines when it came to the actual votes cast in the South. Roosevelt fared well in the border states, 
where he retained Delaware, Maryland and West Virginia, gained Missouri (a state twice lost by 
McKinley), but lost in Kentucky (a state McKinley had carried in 1896, but not in 1900). 
Roosevelt wrote to historian James Ford Rhodes that he “cared especially for carrying Missouri 
because that is a partly Southern State.”42 Nevertheless, the story in the upper and lower South 
was unchanged: Roosevelt was rejected across the board in favor of his Democratic opponent. 
Though he bettered McKinley’s 1900 share of the vote in Arkansas and Florida, in the other 
states the Republican share of the vote fell when compared with 1900. Evidently, Roosevelt’s 
courtship strategy had yet to have taken effect in a measurable way. 
Even before he won the 1904 election, there were signs that Roosevelt was going to 
continue his effort to woo white southerners into his second term. He wrote to Silas McBee in 
July of that year regarding the creation of a taskforce of influential southerners who, after 
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November, could “come to see me at the White House, and see if I cannot arrive at some policy 
as regards the South which will, as far as possible, not be susceptible of misconstruction!”43 He 
wrote to another correspondent a couple of weeks later, bemoaning the unfair treatment he 
received from southerners: “Not a law has been passed or threatened affecting the negro or the 
southern white in his relation to the negro during the three years that the South has been 
indulging in hysterics over me… I have had to exercise all my power to prevent something being 
done in a vindictive or a retaliatory spirit.”44  He reiterated these sentiments the following day to 
Rhodes, explaining his appointment of African Americans as—more overtly than usual—
tokenism: “just enough to make it evident that they were not being entirely proscribed.”45 It 
seemed apparent, even before it started, that Roosevelt’s second term would seek to build upon 
the courtship strategy of his first.  
In February 1905, Roosevelt made a speech about the so-called “Negro problem” at the 
Lincoln Dinner of the Republican Club of New York City. He spoke of national reconciliation 
and suggested that, although there was no “perfect solution,” it was important for black people 
to seek education and avoid sheltering their own criminals if there were to be progress. The 
speech was far from radical and, though it condemned lynching, Roosevelt also argued that the 
person who was best placed to help an African American was the “white man who is his 
neighbor.”46 The week after his speech, Roosevelt indicated that he felt the tide was beginning to 
turn: “At present,” he told Rhodes, the South is, “as a whole, speaking well of me. When they 
will begin again to speak ill I do not know.”47 The New York Tribune, suggested that such 
sentiments had been stirred by the 1904 election, and noted the participation of “an unusually 
large number of Southern Governors and military organizations in the inauguration 
ceremonies.”48 That summer, building upon this perceived shift in the views of southerners, lily-
white Republican (and former senator) Jeter Pritchard of North Carolina wrote to the president 
about an exciting new plan dreamed up by their mutual acquaintance John McLaurin the 
erstwhile junior Democratic senator for South Carolina.49 Pritchard said the time was better than 
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any since Robert E. Lee’s surrender for the Republicans to do something in the South, and that 
thousands of Democrats wished to switch affiliation in South Carolina. Pritchard continued by 
outlining a plan, purported to be McLaurin’s, for the former Democratic senator to lead a new 
movement in the state that would draw disaffected Democrats into the Republican ranks.50  
With such momentum seemingly building, Roosevelt took a tour of the South in 
October 1905.51 For historian Edward Frantz, who contrasts Republican presidential tours of the 
South across several decades, the tour was a “critical turning point” signaling Roosevelt’s move 
away from African Americans and towards wooing white southerners.52 While it is fair to say that 
it marked a more overt courtship of white southerners, it was hardly a departure from what 
Roosevelt had by now been doing for several years. Nevertheless, accounts abound that 
Roosevelt was greeted with much adulation upon his arrival in the South. The Times Dispatch, 
reporting on the president’s first visit to the old Confederate capital of Richmond, noted that:  
Four years ago, and at this very season, he made himself in a single night the 
most hated man known to the white people below the Mason and Dixon’s line; 
to-day idolized by the entire country, he comes to draw back to him the South, 
already won, and to cause in Richmond a demonstration of enthusiastic 
approval, the like of which has seldom, if ever been seen before in all 
Virginia.53 
 
As Roosevelt toured the former Confederacy, he spoke with warmth about Confederate 
veterans, General Robert E. Lee, his own Georgian mother and her Confederate family, and 
even of the number of southerners among his Rough Rider regiment in Cuba during the 
Spanish-American War.54 One newspaper sarcastically remarked that by the end of his time in 
Virginia, “One would suppose that the President himself fired the last shots from the [CSS] 
Alabama instead of his uncle.”55 The New York Tribune suggested that southerners could now 
see that Roosevelt had “sought no quarrel with them or their ideas; that he was moved only by a 
sincere desire to carry into effect his theories of a ‘square deal’ for every class and for every 
section.”56 Not all of the press felt Roosevelt’s warm reception and reciprocal friendly yet 
ambiguous speeches were sincere, especially in South Carolina, but even these voices admitted 
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that much “slobbering” over Roosevelt had taken place.57 Summing up the trip, one Mississippi 
publication announced that, though it was a proud Democratic newspaper, “we think we can 
conscientiously extend our fist to President Roosevelt, the South’s friend, the United States’ 
wisest president and the world’s greatest diplomat. Here’s to you Teddy.”58 By all accounts, 
Roosevelt’s blushing southern debut was considered a triumph; the State of Virginia’s legislature 
even endorsed him for a third presidential term.59  
 Following Roosevelt’s successful tour of the South, Pritchard wrote once more to the 
president and enclosed a letter he had received from McLaurin regarding the plans he mentioned 
to Roosevelt before his excursion.60 Pritchard presaged the enclosure with a short note, pointing 
out his disappointment with McLaurin, who appeared to have backtracked from playing an 
active role in this pursuit.61 McLaurin felt that Roosevelt’s tour had convinced the South that he 
would bring about the “formation of a new white party” and that this was perhaps the main 
reason for the warm welcome the president had received. However, McLaurin argued that his 
running as an independent stalking horse in South Carolina, as Pritchard and the president had 
previously suggested, would be certain to fail. He urged Roosevelt, instead, to run for another 
term in 1908 and stand as a non-partisan candidate that neither party could afford not to 
nominate.62 Here a “Roosevelt” Democrat was urging the president in 1905, to do in 1908, what 
he effectively was forced to do in 1912. Roosevelt wrote back to Pritchard the following day that 
if it appeared the warmth of his reception in the South was due to “the belief that I intended to 
inaugurate a new white party,” he had not expressed such a sentiment overtly at any point upon 
the tour.63 At this point in time, however, right up to losing the nomination to Taft in June 1912, 
Roosevelt wanted to lead a movement in the South along very similar lines to those McLaurin 
suggested, but subtly and from within the Republican Party. 
 The rhetorical goodwill of the South did not, however, convince Roosevelt that votes 
would soon follow. “I am half a southerner myself,” Roosevelt wrote to Owen Wister in 1906, 
before going on to lament that “when I have tried to fall in with the views of the very southern 
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people… you seem to be upholding, the results have been worse than in any other way.”64 In late 
September that year, days of race rioting broke out in Atlanta, Georgia, and Roosevelt remained 
largely mute on the issue, and certainly did not threaten to come to the aid of black 
southerners.65 African-American civil rights activists criticized Roosevelt’s inaction, ushering in a 
season of fire-fighting for Booker T. Washington who himself was increasingly becoming the 
target of the more radical activists’ ire.66 Privately, Roosevelt wrote to his friend, Louisiana 
businessman John M. Parker, that the riots were caused by “the wickedness of certain white 
leaders” who riled up both races in the South. The president also assured Parker that he had 
spoken out publically on the subject of race violence in the South in previous speeches and that 
any further intervention would be unwise.67 Roosevelt was continually frustrated by the coldness 
shown to him by the white South, despite his numerous advances, yet he kept these vexations—
in the main—on the pages of letters to his friends and allies.  
If white southerners still did not believe that Roosevelt was their man, the president gave 
them further pause for thought that same year. In August 1906, Roosevelt was informed of an 
incident that had occurred in Brownsville, Texas, where it was reported that African-American 
soldiers of the 25th Infantry had launched a display of violence in the town, firing shots into 
buildings and at bystanders.68 Roosevelt requested an investigation, which went on to be 
dominated by white witnesses and where the soldiers were accused of conspiring to protect the 
real culprits. The crux of the situation came, however, when Roosevelt went on to discharge all 
of the soldiers—without honor—releasing the order, tactically, the day after the midterm 
elections had taken place in November.69 The president was hounded in the press almost as 
dogmatically as he had been after the Booker T. Washington dinner, but by precisely the 
opposite side of the political spectrum. Republican Senator Joseph B. Foraker of Ohio, a man 
with his own presidential ambitions, continued to keep the issue alive right up to the elections of 
1908, with African Americans across the nation dismayed at what they saw as Roosevelt’s change 
of tone.70 Brownsville was as much of a disaster as the Washington dinner in terms of public 
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relations, but equally, in Roosevelt’s mind, a misreading of his intent. He declared himself, 
“amazed and indignant” at the views of blacks and sympathetic whites toward his actions, and 
argued that the dismissals were a matter of “naked right and wrong” and that the soldiers were to 
blame for banding together to “shelter their criminals.”71 Roosevelt claimed that Brownsville was 
not about race inequality, in the same way that inviting Washington to dinner was not about race 
equality; once again, however, this was difficult to spin to the public. For black leaders in the 
North, like W. E. B. Du Bois, Brownsville was simply another symptom of the Republicans’ 
abandonment of the black population. Du Bois told one correspondent: “It is not that I wish to 
desert the Republican party, but it is that the Republican [sic] seems about to desert me and 
mine. And I do not propose to go with it.”72  
As Roosevelt’s final year in office dawned, Brownsville and its aftermath rumbled on, 
and his anointed successor for the Republican nomination, Secretary of War William Howard 
Taft, was marred by the same controversy. Roosevelt’s rival, Senator Foraker, not only pointed 
to Brownsville again, but also denounced the pro-Taft lily-white convention in Virginia that 
April as bringing into question “human rights.”73 Foraker’s voice was in concert with that of Du 
Bois, who wrote to the Chairman of the National Republican Committee, concerning lily-white 
delegations, that “no group of people can afford to support a Party which without reasons 
excludes them from its counsels.”74 While the solid black Republican vote in the North seemed 
to be under threat, Roosevelt (and Taft) still appeared to be more interested in making headway 
in the white South. Roosevelt assured one journalist that Taft was in perfect accord with himself 
when it came to the race question: “Most emphatically Taft will not make a Garrisonian issue of 
the questions of Negro suffrage.”75 Silas McBee, the influential southern editor, lauded 
Roosevelt’s policy of making himself “President of the whole Nation,” noting that, “In his 
Federal appointments in the South he has gone entirely outside party lines.” McBee even held up 
Roosevelt and Taft’s handling of Brownsville as evidence of their commitment to justice.76  
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In November, Taft won the presidential election with ease against William Jennings 
Bryan, who failed at his third and final attempt. In the South, Taft gained white support in 1908 
(unlike Roosevelt in 1904), recording a close second in both North Carolina and Tennessee.77 
For Roosevelt these were really his gains: “the fight being made straight out for Taft as 
representing my policies.”78 Roosevelt claimed once again, in the face of accusations to the 
contrary, that he had made a concerted effort to win in the South across his two terms, and 
added that his policy of appointing whites, including Democrats, ahead of blacks was one 
endorsed by many ex-Confederates of high regard.79 President-elect Taft visited the South in 
January 1909 and lauded Roosevelt’s success in the region, as well as the “hearty support” 
Roosevelt found there and which he now also felt. Most importantly, Taft outlined a 
continuation of Roosevelt’s courtship policy, noting that he would keep making “such 
appointments in the South as shall prove this [his] sympathy to be real and substantial.”80 When 
Roosevelt left the White House in March, it appeared that his southern courtship strategy was in 
safe hands, along with the rest of his policies. Time would show Roosevelt that only the former 
was correct.81  
 
Coda 
The breakdown in relations between Taft and Roosevelt has been the subject of many studies, 
yet the South was not really an area where their policies had diverged markedly prior to 1912.82 
When Roosevelt finally announced he would run against Taft for the 1912 Republican 
nomination, John McLaurin wrote enthusiastically that he would support and promote 
Roosevelt’s policies in whatever way he could.83 Indeed, it was in the South that the most divisive 
and bitter part of the 1912 Republican nomination campaign played out.84 In attempting to win 
the Republican delegates in the region in 1912, Roosevelt accused Taft of putting southern 
“offices on the auction block” in North Carolina.85 However, as Joseph Steelman notes, many 
North Carolina Republicans that supported Roosevelt were actually highly concerned with Taft’s 
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distribution of patronage to Democrats during his term—a policy Roosevelt had steadfastly 
adhered to—even if this was not their only issue with the Taft administration’s policies.86 
Regardless of this, it is true to say that Taft’s southern delegate-grabbing effort, orchestrated by 
William B. McKinley, began earlier, and was more effective in securing delegates, than 
Roosevelt’s alleged counter-campaign in the region.87 Of course, Roosevelt’s long-term courtship 
of white Democrats offered little more than the moral support of McLaurin when it came to 
GOP-only votes such as this. At the Republican National Convention that summer, Taft saw off 
Roosevelt’s challenge and the aid of Taft’s southern delegates proved decisive. Roosevelt, in 
turn, bolted the Republican Party and opted to run a third-party campaign instead. 
The tale of Roosevelt and the making of a white Republican South ended with his 
Progressive “Bull Moose” Party campaign for the presidency, which has been dealt with in depth 
elsewhere.88 In some respects, Roosevelt took a similar course with his Progressive campaign by 
adopting a pro-white strategy to attract southern Democrats. However, not without hesitation, 
Roosevelt took the extra—and fatal—step of adopting an overtly sectional strategy as a 
Progressive: he ran a “lily-white” campaign in the South and courted blacks in the North. 
Unsurprisingly, it was hard to see either approach as sincere.89 Where the white South had always 
been suspicious of Roosevelt’s racial views, despite his constant overtures since the Washington 
Dinner, the sectional Progressive campaign showed too cynically that Roosevelt wanted to have 
his cake and eat it. The multiple options before voters in 1912 served to inflict yet further 
damage to both the Republican and the Progressive causes in the South. First, it created a three-
way split among existing southern Republicans: Taft Republicans, Roosevelt Republicans 
(looking toward state elections) and Roosevelt Progressives (looking more toward the 
presidential election).90 Furthermore, the option of a genuine southern candidate, in the form of 
Democrat Woodrow Wilson, did little to convince white Democrats to jump ship for either 
Roosevelt or Taft.91 Wilson swept the South in a landslide and what work had been achieved by 
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Roosevelt, and built upon by Taft prior to 1912, was swiftly and ingloriously undone by 
Roosevelt’s rash actions in 1912.  
 Though historians have ascribed to Roosevelt several different “southern strategies,” the 
only one that lasted across the years was his slow courtship of the white South. “Courtship” is an 
apt term, as Roosevelt’s strategy was designedly slow and cautious—at least after the Washington 
dinner—to the extent that he often lost patience with the target of his affections in private 
correspondence. He had taken care to avoid casting others entirely aside, lest his advances were 
ultimately unreciprocated and he had to retreat to a safer option. However, in 1912 Roosevelt 
became abrupt and sought a rapid conquest before the groundwork had been fully completed. In 
so doing, he upset both the object of his desire and those voters he had strung along across the 
years. Regardless of this, the realignment of the African-American vote had yet to begin in force: 
this was a relationship that could still be salvaged, though it would continue to prove fruitless in 
terms of presidential votes in the region for decades to come.92 Whether Roosevelt’s southern 
courtship strategy would ever have been successful, had the events of 1912 not brought about its 
untimely end, is difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize what Roosevelt 
tried and failed to achieve at the end of the long nineteenth century and, in so doing, reassert the 
primacy of his often underplayed courtship strategy toward the white South.  
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